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The negotiations between the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) have entered the next ‘hot’ phase. 
The EU is pushing for an agreement on the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) to be ready to be signed off in principle at 
the June European Council to create certainty on transition and the process to follow. But domestic and EU pressures 
on Theresa May imply both a hard Brexit and the Irish border backstop. The only way she can get this through 
parliament is by taking the UK to the brink of no deal. 
 
Roadblocks ahead 
 
There are sizable roadblocks on the UK side that prevent an early agreement. There is a renewed debate on the 
Customs Union after the transition, including voices in her party who believe that a soft Brexit is essential to minimise 
economic harm. But this is unacceptable to the Brexiteers: it takes away the last (unrealistic) economic promise of 
Brexit – the freedom to make global trade deals – and thus makes a mockery of the idea of regaining control. 
 
A further crucial stumbling block is the backstop on the Northern Ireland border, with both sides agreeing that it must 
remain frictionless without physical infrastructure. But the UK has struggled to come up with a solution that also meets 
its red lines, exiting the Customs Union and the Single Market. Consequently, the EU27, led by Dublin, insist on a 
backstop that implies a customs border in the Irish Sea unless realistic alternatives are found. However, the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), on whose votes Theresa May relies for her parliamentary majority, adamantly 
opposes this.  
 
An unresolved issue that could stir a hornet’s nest among Brexiteers is a possible extension of the transition period 
beyond December 2020. It is virtually inconceivable to conclude a meaningful long-term deal in less than two years, 
but legally it is practically impossible to extend the transition period unless there is a provision for it in the WA. In the 
eyes of hard Brexiteers, a further year or even two is unbearable for two reasons. First, it maintains the “vassal state” 
status for even longer. Second, if extending the transition beyond the next General Election, it could lead to a shift in 
direction towards a Norway+ solution.  
 
The carrot and the stick 
 
With these roadblocks ahead, the Prime Minister depends on a very uncertain majority in the House of Commons. But 
without the WA, there is no transition: the cliff edge looms. Despite the absence of a majority for any type of Brexit, by 
autumn, Westminster must agree to the WA to avoid the ‘no deal’ scenario. 
 
To succeed, Mrs May will have to try to please all sides as far as possible while respecting the EU's red lines. The 
Brexiteers will hence get the exit from the Customs Union and the Single Market, including exiting EU jurisdiction. The 
DUP will have to live with the backstop, sweetened by an (undeliverable) ‘iron-clad’ guarantee from the government 
that there will be no customs border in the Irish Sea and, as before, some more funding for Northern Ireland. To the 
   
 
 
 
2 
soft Brexiteers, the government will promise the closest possible economic partnership that is almost as good as 
being inside, although this will stretch credulity. Even the hard Brexiteers now realise that ‘cakeism’ – the benefits of 
integration without the obligations – is not on offer. 
 
But all this will not be enough to get crucial votes through the House of Commons. She will also have to put her fate 
on the line to stoke fears of a Corbyn government, play the migration card strongly to put pressure on a significant  
part of the Labour Party, and portray future security, justice and research relationships as being contingent on the  
WA agreement. 
 
To the edge of the cliff and beyond? 
 
In the end, the most effective card she has is a version of the classic game-theory concept of ‘chicken'. Chicken 
implies making mutual destruction inevitable unless the other side concedes. If time becomes too short to continue 
negotiating, the cliff edge looms. The UK is then bound to leave the EU in March 2019 without any deal at all. In this 
case, a vote against the WA would threaten to bring down the government and have a devastating effect on the 
country and the political futures of MPs.  
 
All this implies that Theresa May must create a crisis to get the WA through and she can best do that by pushing the 
decisive vote as late in the year as possible. There is no resolution likely before the Conservative Party conference 
(30.9.-3.10.), where Theresa May will have to demonstrate her defence of the UK red lines. The critical EU moment  
is likely to be the 18-19 October Summit, but Theresa May might even be tempted to push it beyond that. Being so 
late in the year is risky: if she fails to scare enough MPs into a vote for the WA, the cliff edge looms for the country 
and her career. 
 
So, at that point, she must have the hard Brexiteers on board who are happy to risk ‘no deal’ (with the certainty of a 
hard Brexit that it implies) rather than concede on their red lines. The proponents of a soft Brexit, driven by a desire to 
reduce economic harm rather than by ideology, are more likely to concede when faced with the cliff edge. 
 
It only gets harder in the long run 
 
Even if Theresa May succeeds, it will not end the UK's difficulties. The clock will still be ticking, so getting a WA 
merely postpones the cliff edge rather than resolving the underlying dilemma: the UK has to choose between 
minimising economic harm (a Norway+ deal) or respecting the Brexiteer red lines at significant economic cost (a 
Canada-style agreement). The latter would inevitably be a ‘bad’ deal: the first trade agreement with no gains from 
increased trade but only costs from disintegration, likely to omit areas of vital UK interest such as financial services, 
while including a list of impossible demands from the EU27, e.g. on governance.  
 
So, a Canada-style trade agreement might well be pie-in-the-sky. But this could be an opportunity: the transition 
period could be the time needed for the domestic political system to overcome the resistance of the hard Brexiteers, 
so that the final outcome is a Norway+ deal, minimising long-term harm for both sides. Currently, at this stage in the 
negotiations, the best that can be done is to keep this door open for the transition period. 
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